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The transition paths from plan to market have varied markedly across countries. Central and 
Eastern European and the Baltic countries, which opted for a fast and profound transformation 
of their institutions including business climates, rapidly narrowed the productivity gap with 
advanced economies. In contrast, in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
which embarked on reforms later and contented with less depth, the productivity gap remains 
substantial. While the literature has focused mainly on empirical studies, this paper develops a 
dynamic search model of the firm start-ups that is consistent with the above trends. The model 
shows that an enabling institutional set up stimulates start-ups of highly productive firms at an 
earlier stage of transition, underscoring the importance of reforms. The role of the state sector 
as an employer during transition rises in countries where reforming institutions is particularly 
costly. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The transition from plan to market has been extensively dealt with empirically at the firm level, 
including the impact of institutions, especially the business climate, and new firms on economy-
wide productivity, output, and employment growth (Fagio and Koning, 2003; Berkowitz and 
DeJong, 2005, Klapper, Lavean and Rajan, 2005; De Loecker and Konings, 2006). On the 
aggregate level, the labor relocation from the less productive state to the more productive private 
sector was a key issue in the theoretical literature, pioneered by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), 
and further developed by Atkinson and Kehoe (1996) and Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997), 
Castanheira and Roland (2000) and others. The experience of the past two decades has shown that 
a successful transition hinges on the dynamic private sector, and especially new firms, to drive 
the productivity and employment growth. At the same time, the global financial and economic 
crisis demonstrated usefulness of well-targeted government interventions, including job creation.  
 
This paper develops a theoretical framework that examines the role of institutions, with a focus 
on the business climate, firm start-ups and exits as well as the observed productivity and 
employment paths during transition. It also discusses the role of the state sector as an employer 
when reforming institutions is particularly costly. Specifically, the paper presents a dynamic 
search model that shows how an enabling institutional set up stimulates start-ups of highly 
productive private firms, leading to a fast recovery of productivity and increased share of good 
(highly productive and well-paid) jobs during the transition. The model explains some of the 
diverging economic outcomes between the Central and Eastern European and Baltic (CEEB) and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) economies. The CEEB countries embarked 
swiftly on economic reforms including the transformation of the institutional infrastructure in 
general and the business climate in particular. In contrast, the CIS countries were slower in 
implementing reforms and still have a long way to go to achieve business climate quality that has 
been already established in the CEEB economies (Mitra, Muravyev and Schafer, 2009). 
 
Labor relocation during transition was accompanied by a debate on the role of the state sector in 
the economy, including as an employer (Roland, 2000; Tichit, 2006). The issue was viewed as 
important because the social costs of transition, in particular high and persistent unemployment, 
could have slowed the transition and possibly bring it to a halt. And in fact, it is the concern about 
the social cost of adjustment that prevents some countries, such as Belarus, to adopt more 
decisive market reforms. With declining unemployment and emerging labor shortages in the 
CEEB countries during the boom of 2000-07, the debate seemed over. The private sector was 
seen as the best way to achieve growth with employment and social stability, and the self-
correcting ability of markets was emphasized. However, as the global financial and economic 
crisis has turned into the global employment crisis, the social consequences have started to top the 
policy agenda. With that turn, the debate on the appropriate role of the state in the economy, in 
providing regulatory framework as well as supporting job creation, has been revived. This paper 
contributes to this debate with insights from transition experiences. It illustrates that in countries 
where reforms of institutions and the business climate have been particularly costly and prospects 
for private job creation poor, the role of the state sector as an employer rises.  
 
The theoretical model presented in this paper extends the framework of Brixiova and Kiyotaki 
(1997), who in turn build on the literature on industry evolution and job creation and destruction 
of Jovanovich (1983) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Unlike Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
(1993) and more recently Foncesa, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001), who study a steady-state 
economy with an unlimited supply of potential entrepreneurs, this model considers a transition 
economy with a limited population of potential entrepreneurs. Moreover, by focusing on the - 3 - 
prevailing business environment and its impact on forward looking entrepreneurs, the model 
complements Fonseca et al. (2001), who emphasize start-up costs.
2  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the stylized facts on the economic 
restructuring and sets out the different reform trajectories that the CEEB and CIS countries have 
experienced so far. Section develops the model of transition with start ups responding to the 
business climate. Section 4 presents numerical experiments and illustrates the model’s 
implications for productivity, structure of the private sector, and employment during transition. 
Section 5 conducts policy analysis and shows that the role of the state as an employer rises during 
the transition if reforms to the institutional set up are sluggish. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2 Stylized  Facts 
 
This section summarizes the main macroeconomic trends that our theoretical model aims to 
capture, namely private sector growth, employment, unemployment, output, and labor 
productivity. It also briefly discusses policies and institutions, which contributed to these trends. 
The CEED economies are compared with non-oil exporting countries of the CIS
3. 
 
2.1 Similar starting conditions, divergent paths 
 
At the outset of the transition, the CEEB and non-oil CIS countries exhibited similar structural 
conditions as they all started from central planning and were dominated by corporate and 
financial structures shaped by the socialist system. In 1990, these countries had a low share of the 
private sector in GDP, lacked competition policy and a well functioning two-tiers banking 
system. The institutional set up and the business climate in particular were characterized by 
rigidities and excessive regulations. The composition of production was skewed towards industry 
and agriculture, whilst services occupied a limited role in GDP compared to other countries at a 
similar level of development (Figure 1). 
 


































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and EBRD transition indicators. Note: The EBRD indicators increase from 1 (little or no change from a 
rigid centrally planned economy) to 4 or more (standards of an industrialized market economy). 
                                                 
2 While job matching frictions also played a role, the low vacancy-unemployment ratios prevailing in most 
countries point to the scarcity of entrepreneurs as the primary constraint to job creation. 
 
3 CEE-5: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the Baltic-3: Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania; non-oil CIS: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine. 
Discussion of the cases of Belarus and Estonia is in Annex I.  - 4 - 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the CEEB and non-oil CIS countries started transition with 
enforced full employment, limited foreign trade and artificially low inflation rates. The 
liberalization of prices and foreign trade (the so-called type 1 reforms) in the early 1990s resulted 
in very high inflation rates and unsustainable current account deficits. Therefore, policy makers 
initially focused on establishing macroeconomic stability. The CEEB countries managed to bring 
inflation rates to low 2-digit territories by the mid-1990s, while the stabilization took longer in 
non-oil CIS countries (Svejnar, 2001; EBRD, 2005).  
 
The CEEB and the non-oil CIS countries differed in the speed and scope with which “type-2 
structural reforms” were put in place. “Type 2” reforms consisted mainly of measures key for 
establishing conditions for private sector development and growth: corporate restructuring, a well 
functioning competition authority, administrative reforms, development of a commercial banking 
sector and effective tax system, infrastructure, labor market regulations, and establishment and 
enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying institutions.
4 CEEB countries 
adopted these structural measures faster and also paid a much greater attention to the quality of 
the framework (Figure 2a).
5 As a result, the business climate has become more competitive in the 
CEEB than in the CIS countries, as also evidenced by mark-up indexes (Figure 2b).  
 
More generally, the CEE-5 and in particular the Baltic countries were placed well above the non-
oil CIS countries in various rankings of competitiveness and the quality of the business climates. 
These include the EBRD’s transition index, the World Bank’s Doing Business 2008 and 
Governance, the Institute for Management Development 2007 competitiveness report, the Cato’s 
Institute Index of Economic Freedom, and the index of the Transparency International.
6 
 






































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the EBRD transition indicators. Averages are 
arithmetic averages. 
                                                 
4 According to Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz  (2007), these institutions, together with access to credit, are 
crucial for an environment conducive to entrepreneurship. 
 
5 Roland (2004) classifies institutions into slow-moving (changing slowly and continuously) and fast-
moving (changing rapidly and irregularly), and underscores the need for further research on the role of 
values and norms in shaping both ideas and institutions.  
 
6 Conceptual issues related to the World Bank’s Doing Business and similar indexes were raised (Arrunada, 
2007 and others). Alternative measures also point to the same overall results for these two country groups. - 5 - 












Source: EBRD (2008).  
 
As Aidis (2003) states, “…productive entrepreneurship cannot be taken for granted in transition 
countries, and is influenced both by the current institutional weakness, as well as by historical 
legacies.” Regarding institutions, EBRD (2008) showed a link between product market 
competition and growth; higher competition (approximated by lower mark-ups) is associated with 
higher firm entry and productivity. Bastos and Nasir (2004) found that the competitive pressure is 
the most critical factor of the investment climate for firm-level productivity.  
 
2.2 Private sector growth  
 
Successful transition from plan to market has depended critically  on the emergence of a dynamic 
private sector. In the first stage, privatization and restructuring of public enterprises was mostly 
associated with short-term job destruction and slow growth in productivity and output. Over time, 
privatized firms have contributed to job creation and growth by using resources more efficiently. 
With substantial lowering of entry barriers, the de novo private small and medium enterprises 
tend to drive the recovery of output, employment, and labor productivity
7. 
 
Aslund and Johnson (2004) emphasized that even small differences in policies towards small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can have a strong impact on private sector growth in transition 
economies.
8 In that context, the early 1990s reforms of the economic and legal environments and 
the straightforward and transparent rules for firm creation in Central and Eastern Europe 
contributed to acceleration in the number of SMEs (Smallbone and Venessar, 2004). Figure 3 
indicates that a higher number of SMEs per capita is associated with higher private sector output. 
 
2.3 Structural transformations  
 
As many new private firms were created in the service sector and to a lesser degree in 
manufacturing, rapid private sector growth was accompanied by a sectoral shift. A  sectoral shift 
                                                 
7 Studies linking entrepreneurship and firm creation with output and employment growth in transition 
include Johnson and Loveman (1995), Bilsen and Konings (1998), McMillan and Woodruff (2002), Faggio 
and Konings (2003), Berkowitz and DeJong (2005), and Rutkowski et al. (2005). 
8 Using a database of European firms, Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) also find that costly entry 
regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry.  - 6 - 
occurred as a correction of imbalances inherited from central planning, where the service sector 
in all countries was underdeveloped in comparison to countries with similar income levels. 
Specifically, in 1990, industry took a disproportionately large share of output and employment in 
all countries, and agriculture played an important role in the Baltic and CIS countries. Transition 
everywhere has been characterized by labor reallocation from industry and agriculture towards 
services, especially in the early 1990s
9. The shift towards services and away from agriculture was 
more marked in the CEEB as compared to the CIS countries (Figure 4). 
 




































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and EBRD transition indicators 
Note: The private sector share in GDP is an arithmetic average over 2002 and 2006. The number of SMEs 
per capita refers to the year for which this indicator is available between 2002 and 2006.  
 























Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
World Development Indicators. Averages are arithmetic averages. 
 
The decrease in the share of industry and manufacturing in GDP is very similar across the three 
country groups (Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and non-oil CIS). In 2006, industry 
                                                 
9 In the late 1990s, when the structures of the Baltic economies approached those of the EU-15 countries, 
job reallocation occurred mostly within sectors (Fabbio and Konings, 2003, Jurajda and Terrell, 2008). - 7 - 
accounted for about 30% and manufacturing for 20% of GDP in all three groups. Yet, the 
composition of manufacturing products changed markedly in Central and Eastern Europe, while it 
remained mostly unchanged in the CIS. Composition of production shifted towards higher-
technology products in Central and Eastern Europe and to a lesser degree in the Baltics, but the 
average high-technology content of CIS exports declined between 1996 and 2006 (Figure 5). In 
summary, also within the group of SMEs, the share of “high productivity” enterprises has been 
increasing more rapidly in CEEB countries than in the non-oil CIS countries.  
 












Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
World Development Indicators. Averages are arithmetic averages. 
 
2.4. Productivity paths 
 
The transition outcomes reflect broadly the diverging reform paths. The transitional recession of 
the early 1990s was shorter in the CEEB, with their real GDP picking up much earlier than in the 
non-oil CIS group (Figure 6). For instance, real economic activities reached their 1990 levels 
already in 1997 in the CEE-5, while the non-oil CIS countries still remained below their 1990 
levels even in 2007. A similar pattern has emerged for economy-wide productivity developments. 
 






















































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Group averages are arithmetic averages. - 8 - 




The model below shows how the quality of institutions, including the business climate, affects the 
entrepreneurs’ choice of the type of firm (or technology) they operate and consequently the 
output, employment, and productivity during transition and in the steady state.
10    
 
In this model, economic transition consists of labor relocation from the state sector to the private 
sector. The population is normalized to one and consists of entrepreneurs and workers, with 
population shares μ  and μ − 1 , respectively. All agents live forever, are endowed with one unit 







0 , where  t c  is 
consumption of a single good in period t, and  0 E denotes the expectations agents form at period 
0 about their consumption in period t.  
 
All agents are initially working in the state sector, that is 1 0 = s . The state sector jobs decline 
over time at an exogenous rateλ , that is s s λ − = &  . New jobs arise in the private sector, where 
they are created through a costly effort of entrepreneurs, x. The search effort costs entrepreneurs 
γ 2 / ) (
2 x x d = , 0 > γ  units of consumption good and leads to a rate x of finding a business 
opportunity. Thus as the size of the state sector decreases, agents become involved in the newly 
created private sector, either as entrepreneurs or workers.   
 
The single consumption good can be produced by one of the three technologies: 
h l s z z z < < < 0 , where  s z is the technology in the state sector, and  h z and  l z are the high-
productivity and low-productivity technologies in the private sector.
11 They also differ in units of 
labor required per unit of output. The profitability of each business opportunity depends upon 
both its productivity (high or low). The business opportunity that the entrepreneur receives is of 
high productivity, h z , with probability φ  and of low productivity,  l z , with  φ − 1 . In addition to 
search effort, each entrepreneur also chooses whether to take the opportunity that arrives or to 
search for a more profitable one. In each period, the business opportunity allows entrepreneurs to 
produce output  it y  using  it n  amount of labor according to it it it n z y = , where  it z denotes the 
business capital in a firm with productivity (technology) i ,  l h i , =  (high or low).
12 Rigidities in 
the business environment at t are treated as a “tax” on high-productivity businesses,  t θ , and are 
reduced during the transition at rate ω ,  ωθ θ − = & . Alternatively, the quality of business 
                                                 
10 This paper does not try to explain differences in transition paths between the Central Europe and 
countries and the Baltics caused by availability of credit, which played role especially around mid-2000s. 
While important, this topic is left to further research.  
11 This model does not explain the reasons behind the low productivity in the state sector. Bajona and 
Locay (2009) develop a model of entrepreneurship under central planning that accounts for the difference 
in long-run performance between planned economies and market-oriented ones.  
12 Since this paper focuses on drivers of productivity growth during transition, it does not try to explain 
why some countries adopted better business environment or institutional set ups faster than others.  - 9 - 
environment could be characterized by an efficiency component,  θ − =1 E . The firm’s effective 
business capital (productivity) thus becomes  h h h Ez z z = − = ) 1 ( θ , where  h z  is the technology 
component and  θ − =1 E is the efficiency component of the business capital (or productivity).
13  
 
Let  μ ) 1 ( t s −  be the total number of entrepreneurs at time t outside the state sector.  Then 
entrepreneurs searching for business opportunities, ut m , and operating business,  t m , satisfy: 
   
lt ht ut t ut t m m m m m s + + = + = − μ ) 1 (          (1) 
 
with lt ht t m m m + = , where  it m  are entrepreneurs operating business of productivity i,  l h i , = . 
The number of entrepreneurs running high and low productive businesses evolves according to:  
 
ht lt ht t t ht m m m s x m δ μ φ − − − − = ] ) 1 ( [ &   (2) 
lt lt ht t t lt m m m s p x m δ μ φ − − − − − = ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( &    (3) 
 
where p is probability that the searching entrepreneurs accept low productive business 
opportunities. Moreover,  0 0 0 = = l h m m , that is no entrepreneurs run businesses in period 0.  
 
The total labor in the private sector, ) 1 )( 1 ( μ − − t s , consists of workers employed in highly 
productive businesses,  ht n , low productive businesses,  lt n , and the informal sector,  ut N :
14 
 
l lt h ht ut t ut t n m n m N n N s + + = + = − − ) 1 )( 1 ( μ  .  (4) 
 
 Suppressing the time subscripts, let 
h J , 
l J and 
u J  be the values of the entrepreneur operating 
a highly productive private firm, a low productive private firm, and searching for a business 




h J J J rJ & + − − = ) ( δ π      (5) 
l u l
l







u J J J p J J x
x






− − + − + − = ∈ ) ( max ) 1 ( ) (
2




   (7) 
 
                                                 
13 This assumption is along the lines of Rodrik (2008) who posits that “bad” institutions tax tradables more 
than non-tradables. Production systems tend to be more complex in tradables, which makes firms in that 
sector more dependent on the institutional framework, especially on contracts and reliable third-party 
enforcement. In the context of the presented model, it is assumed that highly productive firms carry out 
more complex activities. Results would not change if  “taxes” on low productive businesses were imposed. 
  
14 The output per worker in the informal sector amounts to  ut z , where  l u z z < . For analysis of how size 
of firms changes with productivity changes and development, see Gollin (2008). 
 - 10 - 
with  1 = ⇒ > p J J
u l  and  0 = ⇒ ≤ p J J
u l ;   l l l l l n w n z − = π ;  h h h h h n w n z − − = ) 1 ( θ π , 
and 
i J & denoting change in 
i J over time, i=h, l. Wages in the private sector,  p w are fractions 
of output, i.e.  l pl z w φ = ,  h ph z w φ = , and are above the income (marginal product) in the 
informal sector.
15  Equations (5) and (6) state that the return from operating a private firm 
consists of profits plus the change of the value of running a firm over time.  According to (7), the 
return from searching for a business opportunity equals the net expected return from running a 
business plus the change of the value of searching.  
 
3.2 Solution  
 
The entrepreneur chooses the search intensity, x, and accepts the low productivity business 
opportunity with probability  p p = so that the marginal cost of search equals to the expected 
marginal payoff.  Denoting ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
u l u h J J p J J L − − + − = φ φ  to be the “value” of a random 
business opportunity to an entrepreneur, this implies L x γ = . For each entrepreneur, the “profit” 
from searching, u π , becomes  2 /
2 L u γ π = . From (5) – (7), L evolves according to:  
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( u l u h p L r L π π φ π π φ δ − − − − − + = &      (8) 
 
where 1 = p  if  u l π π > , and  0 = p  if  u l π π < , and  u l p π π = ⇔ = 0 , i.e. the entrepreneur 
operated the low-productive business as long payoff of doing so exceeds that of continued search.  
 
The equilibrium transition path for total number of entrepreneurs, that is those operating high and 
low productivity firms, thus becomes: 
  
m m s L m δ μ γ − − − = ] ) 1 ( [ &       (9) 
 
where   0 0 = m ,  l h m m m + = . The dynamics in L is thus caused by changes in the “tax” on the 
business environment,θ , as well as by changes in probability to operate low productivity 
business. For a given θ More specifically:  
m m s L m δ μ γ − − − = ] ) 1 ( [ &  ;  m m m m l h ) 1 ( ; φ φ − = =  when  1 = p    (9a) 





π =  when  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ p         ( 9 c )  
where for a given level of business environment θ    
=
+
− − + −
=
δ




u l u h ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
] ) 1 ( [
] ) 1 ( [ 2 ) ( ) (
2
p
p r r l h
φ φ γ
π φ φπ γ δ δ
− +
− + + + + + −
 (10). 
                                                 
15 Temple (2005) provides a rationale and derivation of this formulation, based on skill differences between 
workers in the formal and informal sectors. - 11 - 
The dynamic competitive equilibrium is characterized by the path of  ) , , ( m p L satisfying (8) and 
(9). Equation (9) and its components shows that for given state sector employment and the private 
firms, the private sector grows more rapidly in an enabling business environment. 
 
Characterizing transition with the phase diagram 
 
Before turning to simulation results, the phase diagram below illustrates in further detail the 
impact of business environment on the speed of the private sector development for the special 
case of the immediate state sector closure and constant business environment. The impact of 
business environment on both transition and steady state can be seen directly from (9), where the 
comparative statics is as follows: ) , , , , (
− + + − +
= δ φ θ γ i z L L . With improvement of the business 
environment, i.e. with lower θ , both the size of the private sector in the steady state and the rate 
of the private sector creation increase. 
  
Transition paths of m and Lfor this case are depicted in Figure 7. The saddle path is the locus 
along which L is constant at its steady-state value. While the control variable L jumps 
immediately to its steady state value, the state variable, m, gradually converges to the steady state 
according to (9).
16 As L increases with the improvement of the business environment, so does the 
search of entrepreneurs and the rate of firm creation, as well as its steady state value. 
Figure 7 shows a phase diagram of the transition economy for the case in which the entrepreneurs 
take all the business opportunities they find during the entire transition, as long as the 
institutions/business climate is characterized by  1 θ  (and hence leads to the equilibrium search 
effort  1 L γ ). The condition for p=1 ( u l π π > ) holds in the region below the  u l π π =  area 
(ranging from L* to L**. In contrast, if the business environment is described by 1 2 θ θ < , the 
associated steady state is located above  u l π π =  area. The entrepreneurs will thus be accepted 
only the high productivity opportunity, if  2 θ  holds throughout the transition. If business climate 
improves gradually during the transition from  1 θ  to  2 θ , then entrepreneurs will initially accept 
running both types of businesses, accept some of the low productive opportunities while in the 
u l π π = area, and accept only high productive opportunities at the end of the transition.










                                                 
16 In the steady state, if the after-tax productivity gap between high and low productive businesses is 
relatively large, the entrepreneurs run only highly productive businesses, i.e. p=0. If the gap is small, they 
run both types of businesses, i.e. p=1. Under the immediate state sector closure the number of searching 
entrepreneurs,  u m , shrinks as quickly as the number of entrepreneurs running firms, m, expands.  
 
17 The productivity transition path thus depends partly on the timing of entrepreneurs’ choice of the type of 
firm to operate (technology). In this respect, the model is somewhat related to Parente and Prescott (2000).  - 12 - 
Figure 7. Phase diagram for the state variable (m) and the control variable (L) 























































4   Numerical Experiments 
 
This section presents results of the model that are broadly consistent with developments in 
transition economies over the past 20 years. In particular, the model simulations illustrate the 
impact of business environment on the firm start-ups, unemployment and labor productivity. The 
time period is one year. Other baseline parameters are chosen to broadly reflect some aspects of 
the annual observations from the transition countries’, EBRD and OECD statistical databases:
  
Table 1. Parameters of the model 
Variable Value  Source 
share of entrepreneurs in population μ   0.2 OECD  LF  Statistics 
annual real interest rate r 0.04  Standard   
rate of destruction of private jobs δ   0.15  Standard (van Ours, 2007; Statistics Estonia, others) 
rate of the state sector closure, λ   0.3 EBRD 
average output in low productive firm  l z   1 Normalized 
wage in the private sector w  0.5  Set to amount to 1/2 of output (within standard rage) 
average output in highly prod. firm  h z   4  Set so that steady state productivity gap is 50%  
income in the informal sector b  0.2  Set to amount to 40% of private wage 
efficiency of entrepreneur's search γ   0.11 
Set so that steady state unemployment with high prod. 
firms only is 9%  
share of high productive firms φ   0.65 
Set so that the average size of SME is 4, as in the 
Czech Rep. (European Commission 2008) 
employment in high productive firm  h n   6 
Set so that the highly prod. firm employs twice as many 
more employees than low prod. firm 
employment in less productive firm  l n   3 
Average size of small/micro enterprise (European 
Commission, 2008) 
  - 13 - 
4.1. Steady state 
Table 2 shows the steady state values under two types of the institutional set up/business climate: 
(1) an enabling one, with the “tax” rate  0 = θ  and (2) a weak one, with the “tax” rate  8 . 0 = θ . 
The more enabling business environment encourages potential entrepreneurs (1) to increase their 
search effort, and (2) to open only high productive businesses. Under the above parameters, 
because the highly productive firms employ more workers, both employment and labor 
productivity are higher when the business environment is conducive to firm start-ups.  






Total share of private firms  13.9  11.8 
Share of high-productivity firms  9.0  11.8 
Share of low-productivity firms  4.9  0.0 
Share of searching entrepreneurs  6.1  8.2 
Share of unemployed workers 1/  16.2  8.9 
Index of the average labor productivity  2.44  3.12 
1/ Includes workers in the informal sector.  
 
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the following key parameter assumptions was carried out: (i) 
the share of high productive business opportunities, and (ii) productivity level in the high 
productive firm. Table 3 shows that the main results are robust to different assumptions:  
 
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis under a rigid business climate 
 
Productivity level in 
high productive firms 
Share of highly 
productive firms 
% of  LF  3.5 4.5 0.6 0.7 
Unemployment 20.5 12.9 20.0 12.5 
Share of high prod. firms  8.4 9.5 8.2 9.9 
 
 
4.2 Transition  
Improving the business climate 
Simulations below show the impact of the business climate on the labor market outcomes in 
transition, taking the rate of the state sector closure as given. The case where the poor 
environment persists ( 8 . 0 = θ ), i.e. the “tax” on the high-productivity firms remains high) is 
compared with the case where the environment improves, reflecting market reforms (the “tax” 
rate starts at  8 . 0 ) 0 ( = θ and follows ξθ θ . 0 − = & , where ξ is the rate at which the environment 
improves. For both cases, the impacts on the size and the structure of the private sector, level of 
unemployment and its duration as well as on labor productivity are examined.  
 
Figure 8a shows that  with improvement of institutions and establishing more conducive business 
climate, during the transition the entrepreneurs shift from opening both high and low productive 
firms  to opening only high productivity ones - this scenario approximates the case of the CEEB 
countries. The case of the non-oil CIS countries (Figure 8b) shows that when a poor business - 14 - 
environment ( 6 . 0 = θ ) prevails, it induces firms to open both high and low productive firms 
during the entire transition. Thus substantial share of private firms are smaller and operating in 
low productive activities. Consequently, the aggregate unemployment can be also higher than 
under more enabling business environment scenario. Depicting different paths of labor 
productivity, Figure 8c shows that when the business climate is more enabling, the average labor 
productivity grows faster and its steady state value is higher than when the environment is rigid.  
 
Figure 8a. Labor market paths where at the end of transition entrepreneurs run only the highly 




























































Figure 8b. Labor market transition paths where entrepreneurs operate both high and low 
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Reducing entrepreneurs’ search cost 
 
An alternative way to stimulate start ups is through reducing entrepreneurs’ search 
costs/increasing their search efficiency. Such policies include training of entrepreneurs, assisting 
them with writing business proposals, and more broadly reducing entry barriers by streamlining 
registration and licensing. Since relative sectoral profits remain unchanged with lower search 
cost, these policies do not influence sectoral allocation of firms, but result in increased number of 
both high-productivity and low-productivity firms and reduced unemployment.
18 Figures 8d and 
8e show the impact of reducing search cost by 20 percent on total number of firms and on 
unemployment when the business environment does not improve, i.e.  6 . 0 = θ prevails, and the 
entrepreneurs thus run both high and low productive firms throughout the transition.  
 
Figure 8d. Impact of reduced search cost (by 20%) on the share of private firms in LF 
                                                 
18 These policies would influence sectoral allocation is if the government selected specific sectors where 
entrepreneurs’ search would be eased. However, such approach would create problems of its own, due to 
imperfect information, and created incentives for rent seeking and inefficiencies. - 16 - 




5   Policy Analysis  
 
The above framework can address a related policy issue: the optimal size of the state sector 
employment during sectoral reallocation and with distortions in the business environment. An 
efficient allocation of state sector employment, private sector entrepreneurs and search effort 
} { x m s , , maximizes the discounted expected utility of the representative agent. Given the 
standard assumption in the search literature that agents have risk-neutral preferences in 
consumption, this is equivalent to maximizing the discounted value of the aggregate output, 
n m z s z p s ) 1 ( θ − + , net of the total cost of searching for business opportunities, 
γ 2
2 x
mu , and net 
of the social cost of unemployment, 
2 ] 1 [
2
m n m s
A
− − − . The net output is maximized subject to 
the law of motion for entrepreneurs (13) and the boundary conditions.  
 
The social planner’s problem therefore can be described as: 
 
dt m n m s
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s.t.       m m s x m δ μ − − − = ] ) 1 [( &        (13)  
 
and  0 ) 0 ( m m = , 0 ) ( lim =
−
∞ → t e
rt
t π , where π  is the shadow value of the extra entrepreneur 
running a private firm.
19  
                                                 
19 Similarly to Burda (1993), the increasing marginal social costs of unemployment prevent the immediate 
state sector closure to be optimal, as the associated costs would be enormous.  This section also assumes 
that the marginal product of workers in the informal sector is zero, without loss of results’ generality.  - 17 - 
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where  0 ) 0 ( m m = .  
 
Equation (15) states that the shadow value of the additional entrepreneur running a private firm is 
the discounted value of the difference in productivity between the state and the private sectors, 
net of the social costs of search. From (16) this value also determines the optimal value of the 
unemployment. Hence, the optimal size of the state sector employment is such that the 
unemployment level is also constant along the transition path. Finally, the optimal search effort 
and unemployment, together with  0 m , then determine the unique optimal path of the number of 
entrepreneurs running private firms, as described by equation (16).  
 
Together, (14) – (16) show that for a given level of state sector employment and number of 
entrepreneurs, the optimal rate of growth of the private sector is slower in a weaker business 
environment. Conversely, the optimal level of the state sector employment is higher the closer the 
productivity gap between the state and private sectors, the higher the social cost that the 
policymakers attach to unemployment, and with less enabling business environment.  
 
Simulations of the optimal transition paths for different business environments show that the 
optimal rate of the state sector closure is slower under more distorted business environment than 
under  a more enabling one (Figure 9). This is because with limited private job creation, workers’ 
opportunity costs of remaining employed in the state sector are low.  
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This paper examined differences in private sector, productivity and employment growth in the 
Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic (CEEB) versus the non-oil CIS countries, 
using a model of labor reallocation and firm creation with transaction costs. The CEEB’s faster 
implementation of market reforms and a more enabling institutional set up and business climate 
stimulated an earlier structural shift towards more productive private firms. This also led to more 
rapid employment and labor productivity growth, and, consequently, to faster convergence to the 
income levels of more advanced economies.  
 
All transition countries would benefit from reducing further the remaining obstacles to private 
sector activities, such as credit constraints, high payroll taxes, and in the new EU members also 
the persistent skill shortages. The global financial crisis and tightened credit conditions have 
underscored the importance of improving the efficiency of financial markets, and especially 
access of small and medium enterprises to credit.   
 
Rational policy makers will and have paced the reduction of public sector employment in line 
with improvements of the business climate and realistic possibilities of creating private sector 
jobs, as shown in our analysis. Where such improvements are slow and costly (as, for example, in 
Belarus due to the political constraints), it is rational to keep workers in public jobs for longer, 
rather than pursuing radical closure of public enterprises. This said, the resulting slower paths of 
labor productivity and output growth are inferior to outcomes in an environment with early and 
vigorous improvements of the business climate. This confirms the importance of undertaking 
structural reforms and strengthening the business climate early on. These lessons of transition can 
be applied to other regions and countries where the business climate is still weak and the public 
sector accounts for a substantial share of employment.  - 19 - 
ANNEX I. Country examples – Contrasting experiences of Estonia and Belarus 
 
The sections below elaborate on the stylized facts by illustrating the particularly contrasting 
strategies to market reforms and outcomes in Estonia and Belarus.  
 
Estonia established very swiftly liberal trade regime and business environment after regaining 
independence in the early 1990s. For some time now, the country has been considered to have 
one of the most open and competitive economies in the world (OECD, 2009). To some extent, the 
enabling business environment reflected close proximity to the EU markets and strong incentives 
of the EU accession that country benefited from.
20 As Gylfason and Hochreiter (2009) write, for 
Estonia “…the prospect of rapid EU integration, the EU perspective, provided a critical anchor 
for sustained political, institutional, and economic reforms across the political spectrum.”  
 
In contrast, with its gradual and often inconsistent approach, Belarus has been lagging behind all 
other transition economies, perhaps with the exception of Turkmenistan, in terms of the speed of 
adopting market reforms. In fact, Belarus’ business environment is considered to be one of the 
harshest in the world, with frequent changes of the rules increasing uncertainty surrounding 
entrepreneurial operations (Smallbone, Slonimski and Pobol, 2008). At the same time, the 
country has put a great emphasis on maintaining high employment and social stability.  
 
Regarding specific outcomes, Estonia’s friendly business environment has led to high rates of 
firm creation and the rapid private sector take-off (Figure 1, AI), even relative to other new EU 
member countries undergoing similar transition such as the Czech Republic (Jurajda and Terell, 
2008). In fact, the private sector has dominated the economy since mid-1990s; specifically it 
reached 70 percent of output by 1996 (EBRD, 2005). In Belarus, however, the private sector is in 
early stages of development, accounting for only about 30 percent of GDP.
21  
 
While relatively high unemployment rate accompanied a substantial part of the Estonia’s 
transition to the market, the official unemployment rate in Belarus has remained in very low 
single digits. Specifically, in 2007 the share of the private sector in employment amounted to 76 
percent in Estonia. While the 2007 figure is not available for Belarus, the private sector accounted 
for only about 20 percent of total employment in 1999 way below of 70 percent share in Estonia 
at that time (EBRD, 2008). However, Belarus’ seemingly good labor market performance 
reflected in low unemployment has been, largely, due to postponed reforms (Brixiova and 
Volchok, 2005).
22 Moreover, the average labor productivity grew more rapidly in Estonia than in 
Belarus (Figure 2, AI).
23 The productivity gap can be partly explained by markedly higher share 
of employment in services in Estonia than in Belarus, while Belarus is characterized by a 
relatively high share of employment in agriculture.   
                                                 
20 Wanchek (2009) found that international trade played a significant role in the emergence of institutions, 
as the high search cost for foreign buyers reduce the potential to export value-added, or complex, products.  
 
21 In practice, this number includes large and medium-sized joint stock enterprises with majority of state 
ownership, so the actual share of the private sector in output may be even lower. Nevertheless, even in the 
difficult conditions, some innovative, knowledge-based private firms emerged (Smallbone at el., 2008). 
22 A high share of the working age population outside of the labor force in Belarus is another factor.  
 
23 The result is derived even with the official GDP data, which have likely overstated the actual output in 
Belarus due to source data that may have introduced an upward bias into the measured GDP (IMF, 2005).  
 - 20 - 























































































































Source: EBRD.  
 














































































1/ Measured in terms of total employment. Source: EBRD database. 
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